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 Pictorial Experience and Seeing 
 Michael  Newall 
 This paper proposes that pictorial experience, the experience that pictures give rise to when we 
understand them, involves the non-veridical experience of seeing the picture’s subject matter. Using 
phenomenological analysis and material from philosophy of mind and perceptual psychology, it 
argues that both pictorial experience lacking awareness of the picture surface, such as illusion, and 
pictorial experience that includes this awareness, i.e. seeing-in, should be understood in this way. 
 Introduction 
 Pictorial experience is the experience that pictures give rise to when we understand them, 
placing us in an intentional relation to the picture’s subject matter. This paper argues that 
pictorial experience involves the non-veridical experience of seeing the picture’s subject 
matter. Despite the criticisms that have been made of such an idea in the past, it retains an 
obvious pre-theoretical appeal. We readily talk about seeing a picture’s subject matter 
when we look at a picture, and this is the product of a deep-seated intuition that our expe-
rience of pictures is directly comparable to our experience of their depicta — that it does 
in some way involve the experience of seeing what is depicted. This intuition impressed 
E. H. Gombrich, and, as John Hyman has recently reminded us, Descartes. 1 
 The intuition fi nds voice in Gombrich’s claim that pictures  ‘ trigger  .  .  . non-veridical 
visual experiences ’ , which forms the central article of his  ‘ illusion ’ theory. 2 This theory, 
and the description of pictorial experience on which it was based, came to be rejected in 
part because it did not acknowledge that the experience of pictures is in important ways 
unlike the experience of seeing their subject matter. In particular, it failed to allow for the 
fact of  ‘ twofoldness ’ , that our experience of pictures often involves a simultaneous visual 
awareness of the picture surface. 3 While I will not consider Gombrich’s particular account 
of pictorial experience here, the challenges of answering problems of this general kind — of 
explaining how pictorial experience differs from actual seeing — will occupy much of my 
discussion. I will approach these problems in two ways. I will make a phenomenological 
 1   E. H. Gombrich,  Art and Illusion :  A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation (London: Phaidon Press, 1960); pp. 
21 – 23; John Hyman,  ‘ Pictorial Art and Visual Experience ’ ,  British Journal of Aesthetics , vol. 40, no. 1 (2000), pp. 
21 – 45. Hyman’s discussion draws on Descartes ’  Optics (in René Descartes,  The Philosophical Writings of Descartes , trans. 
J. Cottingham  et al. [Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1985]). 
 2   Gombrich,  ‘ Mirror and Map ’ , in  The Image and the Eye :  Further Studies in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation 
(Oxford: Phaidon Press, 1982), p. 180. For Gombrich’s illusion theory, see  Art and Illusion , especially pp. 3 – 6. 
 3   This is the criticism levelled at Gombrich by Richard Wollheim,  ‘ Refl ections on  Art and Illusion ’ , in  On Art and the Mind 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard U.P., 1973), pp. 261 – 289. 
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analysis of pictorial experience, showing that pictorial experience does indeed involve the 
experience of seeing (and often too, the experience of seeing the picture surface); and I 
will draw on work on vision in philosophy of mind and perceptual psychology, showing 
that those features of pictorial experience that have in the past been thought to distinguish 
it from ordinary seeing are in fact features of ordinary seeing. 
 I develop my argument as follows. I fi rst describe what I mean by  ‘ the non-veridical 
experience of seeing ’ . I then examine what seems to me the best existing account of picto-
rial experience, a  ‘ disjunctive ’ account, such as that proposed by Dominic Lopes. On such 
an account, Richard Wollheim’s infl uential concept of seeing-in, which incorporates two-
foldness, describes one kind of pictorial experience. But there are also others, which differ 
from seeing-in in lacking an awareness of the picture surface. I then discuss how such ex-
periences can be described as non-veridical experiences of seeing, before turning to the 
harder task of showing that seeing-in also involves such experiences. This is hard because 
Wollheim claims that seeing subject matter in a picture surface, and actually seeing that 
subject matter, are  ‘ incommensurate ’ experiences — i.e. the former cannot be analysed in 
terms of the latter. The remainder of the paper argues that Wollheim is wrong about this, 
and that seeing-in, like other kinds of pictorial experience, can be understood in terms of 
the experience of seeing. 
 Before I begin I should add one proviso. I take it that pictorial experience is visual, but 
this is not universally accepted. In particular, it has been argued that pictures can also be 
experienced through other sense modalities. Lopes, in particular, has argued that pictorial 
experience may be tactile. 4 As it is beyond the scope of this paper to enter this debate, I 
direct the reader to another writer’s argument against this claim. 5 
 The Non-Veridical Experience of Seeing 
 The account of seeing I give here is derived loosely from work by Mohan Matthen. 6 I un-
derstand seeing to be intentional, i.e. to see is to see something, some object X, or some 
kind or property X, instantiated in an object. Seeing X is a process that includes the follow-
ing causally related items: 
 (i)  stimulation of a subject’s visual system; 
 (ii)  a consequent engagement of the subject’s ability to visually recognize X; and 
 (iii)  a consequent visual experience of X by the subject. 
 The visual system includes the eyes, the optic nerves, and the parts of the brain involved in 
vision. Ordinarily, in veridical seeing, light refl ected from something, X, projects through 
the subject’s pupil, and stimulates the retina. Signals from the retina are sent through the 
 4   Dominic McIver Lopes,  ‘ Art Media and the Sense Modalities: Tactile Pictures ’ ,  Philosophical Quarterly , vol. 47, no. 189 
(1997), pp. 425 – 440. 
 5   Robert Hopkins,  ‘ Touching Pictures ’ ,  British Journal of Aesthetics , vol. 40 no. 1 (2000), pp. 149 – 167. 
 6   Mohan Matthen,  Seeing, Doing and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), 
ch. 1. 
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optic nerve to be processed by the various parts of the brain devoted to vision. If the sub-
ject is to see X, this processing must involve the engagement of the subject’s ability to visu-
ally recognize X. Recognition in turn gives rise to a certain conscious state in the subject, 
a visual experience of X. Matthen points out that experience should not be thought of as a 
side-effect — an epiphenomenon — of recognition; rather, it plays an important part in hu-
man cognition. Experience is  ‘ the consciously available record ’ of recognition, and  ‘ the 
 normal means by which an observer  .  .  . gains access to the results of sensory classifi cation 
for the formation of beliefs ’ . 7 That is, visual experience plays a functional role in seeing, 
enabling visual information to contribute to the larger economy of the human mind. 8 
 Two features of this account will particularly bear on my discussion. First, it will be 
clear that seeing includes both genuine, or what I shall call veridical, seeing, and non- 
veridical seeing. Non-veridical seeing could involve a visual hallucination of X, a dream of 
X, or a visual imagining of X. It could also involve visually mistaking some other object for 
X, or being subject to an illusion of X’s presence — and, I shall argue, understanding a 
 picture. I shall say more about non-veridical seeing below. Second, the experience of seeing 
is distinguished from, but dependent on, visual recognition. The distinction between rec-
ognition and experience is underlined by the fact that the former can, and does, occur 
without the later. Matthen sets this point out by examining examples, such as blindsight, in 
which recognition and experience are dissociated. 9 At the same time, since the experience 
of seeing is the conscious record of recognition, experience, when it does occur, is depen-
dent on recognition. This will be important since below I will explain features of pictorial 
experience by appealing to the modular structure and robustness of our visual recogni-
tional abilities. 
 While making a distinction between the veridical and non-veridical experience of see-
ing is appealing, it requires some care. Since this distinction is logical, it is not enough to 
say, for example, that the veridical experience of seeing depends on a causal link between 
the experience of seeing X and X itself, of the kind outlined above. 10 I defi ne the  experience 
  7   Ibid ., pp. 25, 27, original italics. Matthen also entertains the idea that experience may be an indispensable part of 
human cognition:  ‘ it may well be that  some mental functions can  only be exercised through conscious awareness ’ 
(p. 27, original italics). 
  8   This is only a partial account of seeing. For instance, this analysis is not intended to exclude the presence of other 
causally related items, as when seeing X is also consequent on someone drawing attention to X’s previously 
unnoticed presence in our fi eld of vision. 
  9   Matthen,  Seeing, Doing and Knowing , pp. 25 – 26. 
 10   For what if the subject happened to have an experience of seeing X when they were presented with not just X, but 
any visual stimulus at all? When the subject is presented with X, it still initiates a causal chain culminating in seeing 
X, so it seems to satisfy the call for a causal link. However, since the subject’s visual system is constituted so that it 
responds to any stimulus in this way, it can hardly be called a veridical experience. These concerns, and the following 
defi nition, are drawn from David Lewis,  ‘ Veridical Hallucination and Prosthetic Vision ’ , in Jonathan Dancy (ed.), 
 Perceptual Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 1988), pp. 79 – 91. Note that Lewis talks about seeing rather than the 
experience of seeing. On my account the experience of seeing is a component of seeing (and the veridical 
experience of seeing is a component of veridical seeing, and the non-veridical experience of seeing is a component 
of non-veridical seeing). 
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of seeing X as veridical if and only if X is present before the subject’s eyes, and the experi-
ence is counterfactually dependent on the presence of X before the subject’s eyes. The 
relation of counterfactual dependence means that seeing X is dependent on X’s presence 
before the subject’s eyes  and , if X was  not so present (if, for example, X was to be obscured 
or removed from the subject’s fi eld of vision), then seeing X would not occur. It follows 
that seeing X is non-veridical just in case X is not present before the subject’s eyes, or, if X 
is present, when this relation of counterfactual dependence does not hold. We may make a 
further distinction between two types of non-veridical experiences of seeing. In the fi rst, 
the experience of X does not have a counterfactual dependence on the presence of anything 
in the viewer’s visual fi eld. Typically, in such cases, the visual system receives stimulation 
from elsewhere in the brain. This encompasses visual hallucinations and items seen in 
dreams and visual imaginings. This kind of experience will not concern me. In the second 
kind, there is some item, not X, present before the subject’s eyes, on which the non-verid-
ical experience of X counterfactually depends. The experience of X is thus dependent on 
the presence of some other item, let us call it Y, before the subject’s eyes, such that if  Y 
were not so present (if, for example, it was obscured or removed from the subject’s fi eld 
of vision), then seeing X would not occur. This is what happens when we visually mistake 
Y for X, or when we are subject to an illusion. I will argue that understanding pictures also 
involves this second kind of non-veridical experience of seeing. 
 Kinds of Pictorial Experience 
 I set the stage for my analysis of pictorial experience by giving a brief account of what 
seems to me the best existing account of pictorial experience. This accords roughly with 
what Lopes has to say: that  ‘ [s]ome pictures,  contra Gombrich, are experienced simultane-
ously as designed surfaces and as of their subjects; other pictures,  contra Wollheim, pre-
clude twofoldness ’ . 11 In other words, there is a variety of kinds of pictorial experience. 
 I begin with Wollheim’s account. Wollheim claimed that all pictorial experience can be 
described as  ‘ seeing-in ’ , although we shall see shortly that it does not adequately character-
ize all examples of pictorial experience. 12 When we understand a picture, Wolheim held, 
we see the picture’s subject in the picture; hence,  ‘ seeing-in ’ . Seeing-in is distinguished by 
a feature Wollheim called  ‘ twofoldness ’ .  ‘ [W]hen seeing-in occurs, ’ he wrote,  ‘ two things 
happen: I am visually aware of the surface I look at, and I discern something standing out in 
front of, or (in certain cases) receding behind something else. ’ 13 Thus, a viewer looking at 
a picture undergoes a  ‘ twofold ’ experience: on one hand, she is visually aware of the fl at, 
painted, printed, or drawn surface of the picture; on the other, she discerns the subject 
matter of the picture, and discerns it as being a three-dimensional thing, standing (typi-
cally) out from a background, or in front of other depicted objects. 
 11   Dominic McIver Lopes,  Understanding Pictures (Oxford: Oxford U.P. 1996), p. 50. I ignore his later proposal that 
pictorial experience can also be tactile. 
 12   Richard Wollheim,  Painting as an Art (Princeton: Princeton U.P., 1987), pp. 46 – 77. 
 13   Ibid ., p. 46. 
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 As Lopes and others have pointed out, seeing-in does not accurately describe all picto-
rial experience.  Trompe l’oeil paintings preclude seeing-in in those instances where they 
give rise to an illusion. 14  Trompe l’oeil is a genre of painting — typically still-life — intended 
to  ‘ trick the eye ’ — to trick the viewer into believing, if only for a moment, that what they 
have before them is not a picture but the depicted subject matter itself. Seeing-in is dis-
tinguished by its twofold character — it involves a simultaneous visual awareness of the 
picture’s surface and of the picture’s referent. But the illusion of  trompe l’oeil does not 
have this twofold character — the viewer is unaware of the picture’s surface — he or she is 
aware only of the (illusory) presence of the referent. In such cases, depiction occurs with-
out seeing-in. There are other exceptions too. Some paintings, similar to  trompe l’oeil , are 
often experienced without any visual awareness of the painted surface, but unlike  trompe 
l’oeil , are not apt to trick us into believing we are in the actual presence of the subject 
matter, nor are they intended to do so. Early Netherlandish painting provides copious 
examples of such pictures, Jan Van Eyck’s  The Arnolfi ni Portrait (1434, National Gallery, 
London) being one of the most famous and most effective in this respect. One might be 
tempted to dismiss such an example out of hand, for we are unused to such effects in our 
culture: even the most exacting print reproduction does not reproduce this effect. Beside 
the general techniques of realistic painting, two qualities contribute to this effect. First, 
Van Eyck avoids laying down any recognizable trace of brushwork that would be visible to 
the naked eye. Second, the details he depicts are so fi ne that they are beyond the resolu-
tion of the naked eye, and well beyond the resolution of print reproduction, except when 
a substantially magnifi ed view is presented. The modern viewer, trained to attend to tech-
nique as much as subject matter, looks at a painting such as this expecting to see some 
trace of the brush or facture, but can only make out ever fi ner levels of detail of the ob-
jects depicted. 15 
 Wollheim, foreseeing objections along this line, claimed that  trompe l’oeil paintings, at 
least when they function as illusions, are not in fact pictures at all — they do not depict or 
represent.  ‘ [Some] paintings are non-representational  .  .  . because they do not invoke, in-
deed they repel, attention to the marked surface.  Trompe l’oeil paintings are surely in this 
category. ’ 16 However, Wollheim’s solution is inadequate, and has failed to convince subse-
quent writers. It requires that  trompe l’oeil , and as we have seen, many other paintings as 
well, are not pictures. And that is too high a price to pay to preserve an account of picto-
rial experience. 
 14   Lopes,  Understanding Pictures , p. 49. Martin Kelly has made the same point. (Martin Kelly,  ‘ Richard Wollheim’s 
 “ Seeing-In ” and  “ Representation ” ’ , in Norman Bryson, Michael Ann Holly and Keith Moxey (ed.),  Visual Theory 
[Cambridge: Polity, 1991], p. 161.) 
 15   I thank Richard Woodfi eld for drawing my attention to examples of this kind. It is worth noting that when he spoke 
of  ‘ illusion ’ , Gombrich may well have had this kind of pictorial experience in mind. For instance, he notes of the 
duck – rabbit fi gure,  ‘ [c]learly we do not have the illusion that we are confronted by the  “ real ” duck or rabbit ’ 
(Gombrich,  Art and Illusion , p. 4.) Woodfi eld makes this point in his  ‘ Peetz and Wollheim on Gombrich’s Illusions: A 
Note ’ ,  British Journal of Aesthetics , vol. 28, no. 3 (1988), pp. 278 – 280. 
 16   Wollheim,  Painting as an Art , p. 62. 
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 Summing up these results we fi nd that, fi rst, pictorial experience can, and in most cases 
does, involve seeing-in. Second, it can involve the visual awareness of the subject matter 
without an awareness of the picture surface. It may do this either as an illusion, as in the 
case of  trompe l’oeil , or without, as in  The Arnolfi ni Portrait . Between them these three de-
scriptions cover all examples of pictorial experience. 17 
 Pictorial Experience and the Experience of Seeing 
 At this point we might conclude, as Lopes does, that the most that can be said about picto-
rial experience is that it involves one or other of these experiences, but that these different 
kinds of pictorial experience share no common feature. This, I think, would be unwar-
ranted. Against this view, I now argue that all these kinds of pictorial experience involve the 
non-veridical experience of seeing the subject matter. In the case of most pictures, this 
experience is accompanied by the experience of seeing the fl at confi gurations of shape and 
colour, and other features such as brushstrokes, that characterize the picture’s surface. 
Here pictorial experience may be further characterized as seeing-in. In other cases, such as 
 trompe l’oeil or  The Arnolfi ni Portrait , the experience of seeing the picture’s subject matter is 
not accompanied by a visual awareness of the picture’s surface. 
 I think it will already be clear that the experience of seeing characterizes these instances 
of pictorial experience that involve visual awareness of the subject matter without a simul-
taneous visual awareness of the picture surface. For they do not differ from the veridical 
experience of seeing in terms of visual experience  per se ; it is only factors extrinsic to ex-
perience that set them apart: their non-veridicality, and in cases such as  The Arnolfi ni Por-
trait , the belief that that experience is indeed non-veridical. 
 There is, however, a potential problem here. Non-veridical seeing, it could be objected, 
entails illusion or misrecognition, and this does not occur with  The Arnolfi ni Portrait . Fleshed 
out a little, this line of thought would run as follows. If we have a non-veridical experience of 
seeing X, it is impossible to distinguish this,  qua experience, from an experience of actually see-
ing X. Thus, if the latter results in a belief that we see X, it is reasonable to expect the former 
to do so too. If this is right, then non-veridical seeing entails illusion, and cannot give rise 
to non-illusory states, such as that we have viewing  The Arnolfi ni Portrait (or, indeed, that 
involved in seeing-in). The fi rst thing to note here is that refl ection on our experience of 
paintings such as  The Arnolfi ni Portrait shows that it is indeed possible to have an experience 
as of seeing something without believing we actually see it. So I have no doubt this line of 
argument is wrong: somehow it misunderstands the relationship between seeing and belief 
fi xation. But how then should we conceive this relationship? I think the right approach is 
found in a modular theory of vision and mind. It is widely accepted that the visual system 
is modular: certain parts of the brain are devoted solely to processing visual information. 18 
 17   We might also separately list a pictorial experience that alternates between visual awareness of surface and 
subject matter, as described by Gombrich ( Art and Illusion , pp. 4 – 5). However, since this  involves an awareness of the 
subject matter without an awareness of the picture surface (plus an awareness of the picture surface without an 
awareness of the subject matter), it is already implicitly covered by my account. 
 18   See, for instance, Semir Zeki,  Inner Vision: An Exploration of Art and the Brain (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 1999), ch. 7. 
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Modular theories of mind provide a useful resource to draw on here. These hold that sepa-
rate modules — neurologically hardwired mechanisms that are function specifi c — exist for 
separate cognitive faculties such as visual recognition, language, and so on. On Jerry 
Fodor’s infl uential theory, once modules have processed this input, it is processed by non-
modular cognitive systems that  ‘ subserve the fi xation of belief ’ . 19 On the basis of inputs 
that activate various modules, we develop beliefs regarding the cause of those inputs. Fodor 
held that modules themselves are informationally encapsulated: they process inputs inde-
pendently of one another, so that information from one does not affect the processes of 
others. This means that the input analysis produced by various modules may be inconsis-
tent, as it is with some optical illusions. For example, in the case of the Müller – Lyer illu-
sion, if we measure with a ruler the  ‘ shafts ’ of the two arrow fi gures we fi nd they are the 
same length, while judging by visual perception alone, we will usually conclude that one is 
longer than the other. 20 On Fodor’s account, this inconsistency of input analysis is resolved 
by higher-level, non-modular systems. These mechanisms would allow us to develop a 
consistent belief, by discounting the input analysis of one module as the product of non-
veridical perception. 
 Such a proposal is complicated by the fact that vision does not prove to be information-
ally encapsulated in a straightforward way. In particular, it is well established that vision is 
cognitively penetrable — information from our beliefs infl uences what we see in a range of 
ways. To take a familiar example, we may stare at a tree trunk with a camoufl aged moth on 
it for some time without seeing it. Only when someone mentions its presence do we be-
come visually aware of the insect. Another familiar example occurs when we have been 
given a verbal or written description of an individual previously unknown to us. Here a 
new belief (that X has certain distinctive, visually discernible properties) can give us the 
ability to visually recognize something (X) that we were not able to visually recognize be-
fore. Such examples make it more diffi cult to maintain that seeing is a process that occurs 
independently of belief-formation in the cases I need it to. For while the Müller – Lyer illu-
sion may be impenetrable, other kinds of seeing are cognitively penetrable, and it might be 
that these include the non-veridical seeing that I attribute to pictorial experience. 21 
 Recent work in cognitive science suggests that this diffi culty may be surmountable. One 
possible way of tackling it is found in a proposal developed by Zenon Pylyshyn, which 
draws on a range of results in perceptual psychology. He holds that a particular stage of 
 19   Jerry A. Fodor,  The Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983), pp. 
119 – 120. Some more recent accounts, such as Peter Carruther’s massive modularity theory (Peter Carruthers,  The 
Architecture of the Mind: Massive Modularity and the Flexibility of Thought [Oxford: Oxford U.P., 2006]) hold that belief 
generation is also a modular process, but these differences between modularity theories will not affect my general 
argument. 
 20   For the Müller – Lyer fi gure and a discussion of the Müller – Lyer illusion, see R. L. Gregory,  Eye and Brain: The Psychol-
ogy of Seeing (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966), pp. 136 – 137, 140 – 160. 
 21   Indeed considered diachronically, even the Müller – Lyer illusion may not be impenetrable. Environmental 
conditioning has been shown to markedly infl uence subjects ’ susceptibility to the illusion. See Robert N. McCauley 
and Joseph Henrich,  ‘ Susceptibility to the Müller – Lyer Illusion, Theory-Neutral Observation, and the Diachronic 
Penetrability of the Visual Input System ’ ,  Philosophical Psychology , vol. 19, no. 1 (2006), pp. 1 – 23. 
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vision — ‘ early ’ vision — is cognitively impenetrable. 22 Early vision involves the processing 
of  ‘ specifi cally visual ’ properties of a scene, including outline shape, colour, textures, and 
properties as complex as volumetric form. 23 In this sense it is an important part of what 
we ordinarily regard as vision as a whole. Pylyshyn holds that penetration, where it does 
occur, happens either prior to early vision, or following it. Noticing the moth is an example 
of the fi rst kind of penetration: when we are told of the moth’s presence we adjust our at-
tention to the scene accordingly, raising our chances of seeing it. Visually recognizing an 
individual from a description is an example of the latter kind of penetration. It involves 
matching the description with the properties that early vision processes. 24 
 Pylyshyn’s proposal is controversial, so I do not want to tie myself to it. 25 However, my 
position does require that something like it is correct: that some parts of visual processing 
are cognitively impenetrable. Would such a limited impenetrability suffi ce to support my 
position? It will, so far as the penetrability of vision corresponds with the respects in 
which depiction is cognitively penetrable — i.e. with the ways in which beliefs can infl u-
ence what pictures can occasion visual experiences of. Without committing to a particu-
lar account of the cognitive impenetrability of vision, there is little point in developing a 
detailed account the impenetrability of depiction here. Still, it is worth noting that the 
examples of impenetrability I have mentioned have equivalents in depiction. Like the 
moth on the tree trunk, pictures often depict things that we do not notice until their pres-
ence is mentioned to us. And just as in life we may visually recognize someone when 
armed with a description of them, so a description of the sitter may allow us to identify a 
portrait’s subject. 
 Let us assume that vision is cognitively impenetrable in the way I require. We can now 
understand how our perception of a picture such as  The Arnolfi ni Portrait can be considered 
as another example of inconsistency of input analysis. On one hand we have an experience 
of seeing the subject matter. On the other, there are contextual cues that also allow us to 
realize that the painting is just that, a painting: the painting’s frame, its place on the wall in 
the National Gallery, the distinctive parallax effects as we move about it, the fact that we 
recognize its subject matter as that of the famous  Arnolfi ni Portrait , and so on. As with the 
Müller – Lyer illusion, these inconsistent inputs are resolved at the level of belief fi xation, 
where we discount the fi rst input as non-veridical. Such modular accounts thus allows us 
to understand how seeing need not be believing. The experience of seeing thus can be, but 
need not be, illusion. 
 Analysing Seeing-In 
 I now argue that seeing-in, too, involves non-veridical seeing. The crucial challenge to this 
claim lies in Wollheim’s conviction that seeing-in is phenomenologically irreducible to 
 22   Zenon Pylyshyn,  ‘ Is Vision Continuous with Cognition? The Case for Cognitive Impenetrability of Visual Percep-
tion ’ ,  Behavioural and Brain Sciences , vol. 22, no. 3 (1999), pp. 341 – 365. 
 23   Ibid ., p. 343. 
 24   Ibid ., p. 344. 
 25   See the commentaries to his article in  Behavioural and Brain Sciences , vol. 22, no. 3 (1999), pp. 366 – 401. 
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 seeing. Speaking of an example that involves seeing the fi gure of a boy in the marks on a 
wall, he claims,
 We get lost once we start comparing the phenomenology of our perception of the boy 
when we see him in the wall, or our perception of the wall when we see the boy in it, 
with that of our perception of boy or wall seen face-to-face. Such a comparison seems 
easy enough to take on, but it proves impossible to carry out. The particular complex-
ity that one kind of experience has and the other lacks makes their phenomenology 
incommensurate. 26 
 There is good reason to doubt this. Seeing-in, I propose, typically involves the veridical 
experience of seeing the picture surface, and the non-veridical experience of seeing the 
depicted subject. 27 The fi rst, despite what Wollheim says, is obvious and uncontentious: 
seeing a picture partly involves the experience of seeing its surface, for we do in fact see its 
surface. The second point is a matter of contention, for it is not immediately obvious that 
seeing X in Y involves the experience of non-veridically seeing X. This is the point I now 
argue. 
 Wollheim has made us used to the idea that we are capable of seeing things in pictures, 
and other fl at surfaces. But the reverse is also true: we are capable of seeing fl at surfaces in 
three-dimensional objects. That may sound an odd idea, but it is one that painters, espe-
cially, are familiar with. In looking at their subject matter, painters are often taught, or 
come by a process of their own, to see it as a picture. Looking at their subject, they see in 
it the two-dimensional shapes they will draw on their canvas, and the colours of the pig-
ments that they need to apply to create their intended effect. They may see scumbled areas 
of paint in roughly textured subject matter, blurred areas of ink or watercolour in a dark 
cloud, broad brushstrokes in refl ections on water, and so on. Such an ability to see-in is no 
doubt often of use in picture-making, and many art teachers have encouraged it. For in-
stance, the common technique of attending to negative shapes essentially involves seeing 
fl at shapes in the subject matter, and reproducing them on paper or canvas. Similarly, the 
technique of looking at subjects through a viewfi nder is in part intended to encourage see-
ing the framed subject as a picture. 
 This ability raises the possibility of a useful comparison. Say we see a picture’s subject 
matter, Y, in the fl at, marked surface of the picture, X. We will also be capable of seeing X, 
the picture, in Y, the subject matter. How will these two experiences compare? Take the 
following example, where X is Paul Cézanne’s painting  Mont Sainte-Victoire (1904 – 06, 
Philadelphia Museum of Art) and Y is the landscape it depicts, viewed from the point 
 Cézanne painted it. The art historian John Rewald has taken a photograph from this 
 26   Wollheim,  Painting as an Art , pp. 46 – 47. 
 27   John Hyman makes a similar statement about this passage:  ‘ the boy looks like a boy, and the marks on the surface of 
the wall look like marks that depict a boy. So  .  .  . it seems to me as if I were seeing a boy ’ (John Hyman,  The Objective 
Eye: Color, Form and Reality in the Theory of Art [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006], p. 142). However, while I 
believe Hyman is right, this position also requires argument in its support. Wollheim’s contrary opinion shows that 
the point cannot be taken as self-evident. 
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 position, which can be used in place of the landscape itself to demonstrate the points I 
make  below. 28 
 Looking at the painting, we see the mountain in it: we remain visually aware of the 
painting’s patchwork of brushstrokes, and we see the mountain in this as if behind pale veils 
of atmosphere. Standing in front of the mountain itself, and without ever losing visual 
awareness of that fact, we can, with a little effort, see-in it Cézanne’s painting. That is, we 
can see-in the scene a fl at surface on which is inscribed the characteristic features of 
 Cézanne’s composition, the colours of his pigments, and, in the rough geology of the 
mountain, the faceted, patchwork quality of his brushstrokes. 
 Now, when we say we see the picture in the landscape, the implication is that we do not 
merely see-in the two-dimensional design of the picture; at the same time we are visually 
aware that this picture we are seeing-in  depicts that landscape . It might be objected that this 
is not so, that we just see-in the picture’s design, colours, and brushwork in the mountain 
view, and that is the end of the matter. But that would be untrue: the surface we see-in does 
not seem to us an abstract painting; it is unmistakably a painting of the mountain view. 
Thus, seeing-in must fi gure  twice in our account of this experience. That is, we see the de-
sign of a Cézanne in our view of the mountain,  and we see in that design the view of the 
mountain. 
 It is here that we come to appreciate that seeing-in must be further analysable, for when 
we consider the actual nature of this experience it is clear that it does not have this order of 
complexity. As I have said, we are visually aware of the seen-in painting as depicting the 
mountain; but at the same time, we do not have a double awareness of the mountain. Rath-
er, our experience of the actual mountain exists in a relation to our experience of the seen-
in picture surface that also allows it to function as the experience of the seen-in landscape. 
How could this be? The puzzle is solved if we accept that seeing Y in X involves the experi-
ence of seeing X and the experience of seeing Y. For if on top of this, Y is a pattern in 
which we can see X, this adds nothing to our overall experience, for it simply reiterates the 
fact that we see X. Seeing Y in X therefore involves the experiences of seeing X and Y — 
 typically, the veridical experience of seeing X and non-veridical experience of seeing Y. 29 
 Some Objections Considered 
 It is important to note that I do not mean that the experience Cézanne’s painting occasions 
of seeing the mountain is identical with the experience of actually seeing the mountain. In 
general, the non-veridical experience of seeing X, occasioned by a picture, may well differ 
from our experience of actually seeing X. This often happens when we see X as having 
fewer kinds of properties than we would actually see it as having. For example, a sche-
matic outline picture might allow us only to see X as having a certain kind of general shape 
 28   Rewald’s photograph, which also demonstrates that Cézanne was largely faithful to the scene before him, is 
reproduced in Pavel Mochotka,  Cézanne: Landscape into Art (New Haven, CT: Yale U.P., 1996), p. 116, fi g. 90. 
 29   The atypical example, of course, is that I have just considered: where we see Y in X, and then are apt to see X in Y, the 
second instance of seeing-in involves the veridical experience of seeing X and non-veridical experience of seeing Y. 
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standing out from a ground. A black-and-white picture will allow us to see X as having light 
and dark tones, being illuminated and shaded in certain ways, but it will not allow us to see 
X as having properties of hue. An impressionist painting, or a painting such as Cézanne’s 
 Mont Sainte-Victoire , will allow us to see its subject as having all those properties, but will 
not allow us to see it as having any kind of fi ne details. As I have said, when we consider 
seeing Cézanne’s painting in the landscape, and then consider seeing the landscape in the 
seen-in painting, we fi nd that the original, actual, experience of the landscape is the only 
experience of the landscape that we have. But this experience is not identical to that we 
would expect the seen-in painting to occasion. Rather, it exceeds that experience; it in-
cludes the experience of seeing the properties of the landscape we would expect to be in-
cluded in our experience of the painting, and it also includes the experience of those fi ne 
details of the landscape that we see in life. Thus, when we see the painting in the landscape, 
and ask ourselves about the nature of the experience we might have seeing the landscape in 
that painting, we may be slightly disconcerted by the fact that there is already a more vivid 
experience of the landscape present, that does not simply coincide with, but matches and 
exceeds the experience of the landscape that we would expect to have in front of the ac-
tual painting. 
 This raises another question. How is it, given that our experience of seeing X occasioned 
by a picture might only in some respects be like our experience of actually seeing X, that it 
can be an experience of seeing X at all? This will not seem so strange when we consider 
that we often have an experience of seeing the same object under different aspects. That is, 
actually seeing an object is often like other instances of actually seeing it only in some re-
spects. For instance, seen in daylight and at close quarters we will be able to see an object 
as having many of its visually discernible properties. But when we see an object at night, we 
cannot see its hues. At a distance, through fog or otherwise blurry vision, we cannot make 
out details of its shape. Through a screen of foliage, or amongst a moving crowd, we might 
see only certain parts of the object. In all these situations we are often still able to see that 
this is the same object (although we might not do so as reliably as we would in more forgiv-
ing conditions). This  ‘ robustness ’ is a capacity that can be understood as characteristic of 
our visual recognitional abilities, for it allows seeing, and so the experience of seeing, un-
der adverse viewing conditions (night, fog, when glimpsed, etc.), sacrifi cing a degree of 
accuracy in the interests of effi ciency. 30 The non-veridical experience is in this respect just 
like the veridical experience: it can involve the experience of seeing X as having many of 
the visually discernible properties it in fact has, or it can involve the experience of seeing 
X as having relatively few of those properties. 
 Another kind of concern is this: my proposal that seeing Y in X involves the experience 
of seeing X and seeing Y might be thought to sit uncomfortably with the way we ordinar-
ily think about seeing. We might be concerned that this would imply that the subject be-
lieves (absurdly) that both X and Y are at once present to our gaze. This worry can be quickly 
 30   Lopes,  Understanding Pictures , pp. 136 – 140. It should be added that our capacity for recognition on the basis of 
relatively minimal information does, however, allow for misrecognition. We can, for example, sometimes mistake a 
stranger for someone we know under adverse viewing conditions. 
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dismissed, for we have already seen that a modular account of mind allows that non- 
veridically seeing Y need not imply belief in it. Two contradictory inputs, X and Y, occur, 
but this contradiction is resolved at the level of belief fi xation, where the non-veridical 
input, Y is discounted. 
 This response does not entirely banish the concern that there is something awkward in 
the notion of seeing both X and Y in the way I have described. My account requires that we 
have an experience of seeing X and of Y, simultaneously, such that one appears in front of 
the other. Each part of X, the picture surface, will be seen as either in front of or behind 
the part of Y that it depicts. Each such part of the picture surface will appear to precisely 
overlap, or to be overlapped by, what it depicts. They do so, though, without appearing to 
obscure, or be obscured by, the subject matter. So, in seeing Y in X (taking the case now where 
we see X as in front of Y) we will see the various parts of X as precisely overlapping 
the parts of Y they depict without obscuring those parts of Y. The concern here is that 
seeing things as overlapping typically involves a  reduced visual awareness of the overlapped 
item — it appears obscured or occluded. This, however, is not the case in my account of 
seeing-in. 
 First, I would stress that however odd it may seem, my description of the twofold phenom-
enology of seeing-in is accurate. In the case of the Cézanne, we have an experience of seeing 
the brushstrokes as marks on a fl at proximate surface, and also, through them, a faraway land-
scape that is not at all obscured by them. Second, this phenomenology is not unique to seeing-
in. Far from being a disreputable notion, twofoldness, as I have described it, is recognized as 
a feature of another kind of visual experience: the perception of transparency. 
 The perception of transparency involves the seeing of one body through another, trans-
parent or translucent one. Like seeing-in, perceptual transparency is twofold in the sense 
that it involves simultaneously seeing two objects as overlapping without the overlapped 
object being obscured. The phenomenology of transparency, and the conditions under 
which it is perceived, have been well studied. 31 It is generally accepted that the perception 
of transparency does involve the kind of twofoldness I describe:  ‘ At the retina, each loca-
tion can have only one value of luminance or colour. When transparency is perceived, 
however, different surface qualities can be redistributed to two or more apparently super-
imposed layers. ’ 32 A transparent pane of red glass overlapping a blue object will, at the 
point of overlap, transmit light that we would ordinarily perceive as violet. In the context 
of the perception of transparency, the phenomenal components of violet — red and blue
 — are  ‘ redistributed ’ , the red to the transparent pane and the blue to the object seen 
through it. That is to say, rather than simply seeing a violet area where they overlap, we will 
have a more complex, and phenomenologically distinct experience: an awareness of a blue 
surface seen through a transparent red layer. Such redistribution can apply to properties of 
 ‘ texture and motion, as well as colour or brightness ’ . 33 
 31   Fabio Metelli,  ‘ The Perception of Tranparency ’ ,  Scientifi c American , vol. 230, no. 4 (1974), pp. 90 – 98. Metelli points out 
that the presence of physical transparency is neither necessary nor suffi cient for the perception of transparency (p. 90). 
 32   T. Watanabe and P. Cavanagh,  ‘ Surface Decomposition Accompanying the Perception of Transparency ’ ,  Spatial 
Vision , vol. 7, no. 2 (1992), pp. 95 – 111, at p. 95. 
 33   Ibid . 
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 It should be noted that there are also differences between the phenomenology of seeing-
in and transparency. For example, picture surfaces are not typically perceived as transpar-
ent. We are, for instance, visually aware of the Cézanne’s surface as made up of opaque, 
rather than transparent, brushstrokes. Another difference is that seeing-in does not simply 
involve one visual awareness  ‘ overlaid ’ with another, in the manner of two transparent 
surfaces superimposed. Rather, particular parts of the subject matter, say various features 
in the case of a portrait — the eyes, nose, mouth, hair, etc. — are seen in particular parts of 
the picture — in particular shapes, brushstrokes, areas of colour, etc. But this does not 
 detract from the fact that both seeing-in and the perception of transparency are twofold. 
The perception of transparency thus shows that visual experience can present the kind of 
twofoldness I have attributed to seeing-in. 
 Conclusion 
 Pictorial experience should be understood in terms of the experience of seeing. This ap-
plies to both instances of pictorial experience that lack visual awareness of the picture 
surface, and to seeing-in. Seeing something, Y, in a picture surface, X, involves the experi-
ence of seeing X and the non-veridical experience of seeing Y. We have found phenomeno-
logical reasons for averring this, and now we have established that the twofoldness it implies 
is itself already recognized as a feature of ordinary vision. 34 
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